



FOREIGN POLICY bulletin

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Can UN Handle 'Indirect Aggression'?

by William R. Frye

UNITED NATIONS—The crisis in Lebanon, where 5000 United States Marines landed on July 15, following the Iraqi coup, was, in a very real sense, a test of the UN's capacity to deal with the world in which we live.

The first report of the United Nations Observation Group in Lebanon, published on July 4, declared that there was no "mass infiltration" of armed forces from outside the country, as had been charged in the UN Security Council by the government of President Camille Chamoun. "There is little doubt, however," said the report, "that the vast majority [of rebels] was in any case composed of Lebanese." At the same time the observers, consisting of about 138 trained military personnel from 14 UN countries, admitted that on occasion they had "experienced difficulty in penetrating Opposition-held territory." And they said nothing about "indirect aggression"—notably the radio broadcasts from Damascus and Cairo which, according to Beirut, had been continually inciting rebellion against the Lebanese government.

Given the East-West nuclear stalemate, subversion and infiltration—alias indirect aggression—have emerged as the principal

challenge to the security of many free-world countries. If the UN is not able to cope with indirect aggression by a minor nation like the United Arab Republic, diplomats at the UN admit, it certainly will not be able to deal with the same challenge by that supreme master of the art of subversion, the Soviet Union.

All the arguments likely to tend toward UN inaction in a case of Communist subversion had been present to counsel caution, indifference and paralysis in the Lebanese case.

There has been the argument of practicality. A UN police force is a costly venture; who would pay the bill? Big-power troops might be politically disadvantageous in such a force; is small-country manpower available? Would a UN force succeed? Or would it just get bogged down in a long, frustrating guerrilla war like the one the French have on their hands in Algeria?

There has been the argument of domestic jurisdiction. Is the Lebanese crisis at core a political struggle between factions within the country rather than a grab for power from outside? If so, is not the UN barred from acting by Article 2, paragraph 7 of the UN Charter, the domestic jurisdiction provision?

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It is possible to imagine parallel arguments being raised, with at least equal force and paralyzing effect, against UN action to rescue a country on the periphery of the Sino-Soviet empire, threatened by a Communist-sponsored, Communist-financed and even Communist-fought civil war.

There would always be the practical problems of money, willing manpower and military capacity until or unless the UN were to build and finance a permanent police force of its own, a project which clearly is many years away from realization.

There would always be the danger that if Communist designs were being frustrated, the Soviet Union would step in openly to support its collaborators. If Soviet threats are to have as much psychological effect as they have had in recent years—at Suez in 1956, in the Turkish-Syrian crisis last winter and in Lebanon this summer—the Kremlin obviously will be tempted to go on issuing such threats. They are likely to be a permanent feature of the diplomatic landscape.

There would always be confusion, at least in some minds, over the extent to which a civil conflict was domestic and the extent to which it was provoked and supported from outside. It would be a clumsy job of subversion indeed which was clearly identifiable as such from the outside.

Thus if the Balkan satellites, for example, were to send provocators by the thousands into Yugoslavia to promote a "spontaneous" uprising against "deviationist" Tito, or if Red

China were to sponsor trouble in Burma or South Vietnam, the UN would face many of the same practical problems of peacemaking which it has faced in Lebanon.

How to meet such a challenge?

UN Umbrella

Secretary of State John Foster Dulles said at his news conference on July 1 that the "normal" and "best" way to handle it would be through the UN. On this nearly everyone agrees, if only for the realistic and practical reason that the UN's moral sanction helps protect a rescue operation from counterpressures, both military and political.

In a touchy situation, UN diplomats feel, a UN "umbrella" could be the margin of difference between success and failure, between freedom of action for the force suppressing the aggression and the dispatch of Soviet "volunteers."

For all its brutality, the Kremlin still feels a need to justify its actions to its own people and to the neutralists of Asia and Africa. To fail to do so, at least in the latter case, could be to negate the effect of billions of rubles invested in propaganda and foreign aid.

There are three levels of possible UN action. One is mediation by the secretary-general. "Let Dag do it" (meaning, of course, Dag Hammarskjöld) is fast becoming a slogan and a formula here.

The second is observation and reporting, a device to mobilize moral pressure on a guilty party through exposure. This technique, it is recog-

nized, is likely to be effective against the Soviet Union or Red China only when national interests they consider important are not involved.

The third level of possible UN action is police work. The UNEF in Egypt, while valuable, is not really a police force; it is halfway between an observation team and an army, but nearer the former than the latter—nomenclature and superficial appearance notwithstanding. A true police force would be an army equipped to impose its will in the face of active resistance.

In the Lebanese case, until the Marines landed, the two devices of observation and mediation had been the principal reliances. When Hammarskjöld saw President Nasser in Cairo, according to the best information, Nasser told him (1) that there was very little infiltration going on; (2) that such as took place was unofficial—that is, it was being done by individuals hard to control; and (3) that he would see what he could do to cut down on it, at least pending the July 24 presidential election in Lebanon.

This latter promise was, of course, the crucial point. If fulfilled, it might have turned the tide. But as events developed, and rebellion broke out in Iraq, the United States and Britain decided to move on to the third level of military force.

Mr. Frye, a member of the staff of *The Christian Science Monitor* since 1941, has been its United Nations correspondent for eight years. He is the author of *A United Nations Peace Force* (New York, Oceana Publications for The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1957.)

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U.S., Canada Seek New Paths

OTTAWA—One does not have to be in Ottawa long to discover that what has been reported about United States-Canadian relations is true: they have been deteriorating. Perhaps President Eisenhower's three-day visit here has reversed the trend. Perhaps the descent is bottoming out and things will improve. Every one hopes so; but not all expect it.

The trouble is that the differences, the irritations, the frictions, are in many cases basic and profound. Good will, determination and imagination are necessary, and would be a great help in reaching any solutions. But, as the President told the Canadian Parliament on July 9, there will have to be some "give and take." Neither Washington nor Ottawa, however, are showing any great interest in "giving" or "giving in." The three-day meeting cleared the air, but it produced few specific results.

In Ottawa one quickly senses the new spirit of nationalism that is sweeping Canada. Some people call it anti-Americanism; but that is a misnomer. Canada, as the sociologists might say, is "feeling its oats." It is a big country, a rich country, a proud country, and it is now a mature country. Its problems may seem secondary in Washington, but they are primary in Ottawa. For example, Washington's surplus wheat disposal program may be secondary in the United States, but it is primary in Canada. And so it goes with other issues. The imbalance of United States-Canadian trade is only of relative importance to America's over-all trade picture; but it is of primary importance and of paramount concern to Ottawa.

President Eisenhower did a good

job in explaining to the Canadian Parliament why Washington followed its surplus wheat disposal policy, why it restricted Canadian oil imports, why Canadian lead and zinc could not flow freely into the United States, why private American capital was moving into Canada in such great amounts. But the Canadians did not want to hear a justification of American policy. They wanted to hear of some changes in American policy. These they did not get. They cheered Eisenhower when he promised to work relentlessly to find acceptable solutions. They clapped when he assured them ways would be found to correct any present injustices. But they sat on their hands when he justified Washington policy.

Pioneering Ideas

There was some original thinking done, however, at this meeting—some pioneering into new paths. For one thing the President and the prime minister came up with the scheme for a joint Cabinet defense committee. The idea is to coordinate more closely the military strategy and direction of the defenses of the two countries. Washington and Ottawa would do in the field of defense what they have been doing in the economic field—hold regular Cabinet talks between their respective secretaries of finance and commerce. But if a joint Cabinet defense committee is more effective than, and as relatively inactive as, the joint Cabinet committee on economic matters, its creation would be more fiction than fact. The joint committee on economic relations has not been meeting even once a year.

Prime Minister John Diefenbaker

(who, incidentally, made quite an impression on the American officials at this meeting) also proposed a new idea for strengthening United States-Canadian ties which was both imaginative and striking. True, he had advanced it on June 8 in his commencement address at Wesleyan University. But in the Ottawa talks he made it official. Specifically he wants, as prime minister, to make contact with the American Congress—not just with the White House and the State Department. He wants to set up joint committees of Congress and the Canadian Parliament.

He has become aware, as does every prime minister dealing with Washington, that it is all right to talk to the White House—but it is Congress that makes the laws and, in the economic field particularly, generally sets policy. He therefore wants to be able to get the Canadian case before Congress without always having to go through the State Department or the Executive branch.

These Eisenhower-Diefenbaker talks suffered obviously from a built-in drawback. Prime Minister Diefenbaker spoke fresh from a political triumph unequalled in Canadian politics. President Eisenhower spoke from a house divided. The Republicans may control the White House; but the Democrats are in control of Congress. Thus while Mr. Diefenbaker could constantly press the President to reach agreements on the vexing issues facing them, the President could not commit his government, and so could do no more than give assurances that every effort would be made to resolve disputes, ease frictions, and reach agreement.

NEAL STANFORD



Russia, China and the West

If there is still anyone concerned with world affairs who believes that any set of relations established between nations, whether friends or foes, can be expected to prove "lasting," he or she must have abandoned this belief, never supported by actual events in history, when confronted with the changing tides of current developments.

While the U.S.S.R. and its supporters in the Soviet bloc once more try to isolate Yugoslavia, and Communist China is even more vigorous than Moscow in denouncing Titoism, the Yugoslav marshal draws closer to President Gamal Abdel Nasser of the United Arab Republic, challenged by the West on Lebanon, and to Greece, in what may prove to be a new neutralist constellation. In this constellation, whatever may be its future course, Greece—which is on the verge of a break with Turkey over Cyprus, shares Cairo's hostility to the Turks—who had been joined in the Baghdad pact with Nasser's opponents, Iraq and Jordan, united in the Arab Union.

In the meantime, the United States was made aware, during Secretary of State Dulles' Fourth of July visit to Paris, that although France under General Charles de Gaulle intends to abide by its NATO obligations, it will insist on playing the role of a great power, the visible badge of which today is possession of nuclear weapons, and will feel free to follow a policy of its own outside Europe. And even our northern neighbor Canada, whose friendship Americans had long been taking for granted, has frankly told President Eisenhower in Ottawa that it expects favorable action on its wide range of economic

grievances against this country.

Most dramatic of all, however, is the relationship between Russia, China and the West which is obviously undergoing profound changes—but changes whose motivations and possible consequences mystify even the experts. Is it true, as some contend, that China has taken the upper hand in the Moscow-Peiping axis and is dictating the new policy of rigidity that Prime Minister Nikita S. Khrushchev has been following toward Yugoslavia, toward Poland and toward the West? Or is it more accurate to say, as others believe, that Moscow and Peiping are in agreement on the course the Soviet bloc should pursue in the next phase, and are but two arms of the same lever applied on the Western bloc in the common hope of wrenching it apart?

Who Leads Whom?

Convincing arguments can be marshaled in support of each of these two views. The crucial difficulty in deciding between their relative merits and reliability is that the United States continues to bar American newspaper correspondents from mainland China, and we must therefore rely for information about that country either on accounts of European, primarily English and French, correspondents, or on information gathered by American listening posts, official and unofficial, in Hong Kong, or else on interpretations by students of Chinese affairs in the United States. These experts, however, many of whom found themselves during the McCarthy period subject to investigation and attack for their contacts in and views on China during World War II, have tended to retreat from the explora-

tion of current events into study of China's history and literary heritage.

In support of the first view, it is possible—and plausible—to say that the Chinese Communists, who today have only reached the stage of economic development at which Russia had arrived in the 1930's, have more to fear from "revisionism" of Communist doctrines, as preached by Tito, than Soviet leaders like Khrushchev. The Soviet premier, having apparently sensed the desire of the Russian people even before Stalin's death for a greater degree of economic relaxation, also had, unlike his Chinese colleagues, the technological capacity to start providing butter as well as guns. It is generally agreed by experts on Russia that Mr. Khrushchev, unpalatable as he may be to the West for his foreign policy, is nevertheless more flexible in domestic affairs than some of the old-guard Communist leaders he ousted. The old guard, when they proved unsuccessful in checking his internal reforms, such as the decentralization of industry and the easing of collective farm deliveries, may have been putting pressure on him to stop possible disruption of the Soviet bloc.

It has also been clear for some time that Mao Tse-tung and his associates did not regard themselves as merely stooges of Stalin. As Allen S. Whiting points out in his interesting article, "Contradictions" in the Moscow-Peking Axis," in the February 1958 issue of *The Journal of Politics*, Mao has stressed that the conclusions he had reached about political and economic development, although similar to those of the Russian ruler, had been arrived at through "independ-

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The Law of the Sea

by Arthur H. Dean

Arthur H. Dean, senior partner of Sullivan and Cromwell, was chairman of the United States delegation at the Geneva UN Conference on the Law of the Sea. In 1953-54 he served as Special Ambassador to Korea, and as negotiator at Panmunjom after the armistice on behalf of the United States and other nations contributing troops.

At a time when there are many doubts about whether we have any friends and whether our policies and concepts are surviving, it is refreshing to examine the extent of the achievements of the United States and the free world at the United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea held in Geneva from February 24 to April 28, 1958.

Prior to the conference the United States delegation was aware that agreement would be difficult to achieve. Indeed, world conditions seemed favorable for Communist and newly created nations to upset the law which had been established before they came into existence.

In contrast to the Hague Conference of 1930, where most proposals were not even put to a vote, the Geneva Conference produced a number of conventions of vital importance. These conventions, now available for signature and ratification or accession, encompass a large area of agreement reached in spite of great difficulties. Moreover, every one of a number of dangerous Soviet proposals was defeated.

In the convention on the high seas the Soviet Union suffered a series of defeats on issues of utmost importance. Thus, its repeated attempts to restrict the testing of atomic weapons on the high seas proved abortive; its proposal that sovereign immunity should apply to all government-owned commercial ships, which would thus be shielded against liability for tortious acts, was defeated; and its insistent attempts to place an easement on the territory of coast-

al states and their ports in favor of adjacent landlocked states was correctly limited to making such access dependent upon common agreement between the coastal and landlocked states on a basis of reciprocity and mutual agreement.

The convention on fisheries established important and useful doctrines with respect to the conservation of the living resources of the high seas and for the adoption of arbitral procedures. Although the doctrine of abstention was not adopted, much progress was made in discussing this doctrine, under which countries would voluntarily refrain from fishing certain stocks of fish in the high seas and would cooperate in conservation programs to protect the salmon and halibut schools of fish from destruction.

The convention on the continental shelf substantially adopted the United States proclamation of 1945. Under this convention a coastal state has exclusive jurisdiction to explore and exploit the subsoil of the adjacent ocean so far as the depth of the water admits without regard to the breadth of its own territorial sea. At the same time, the free use of the overlying waters for navigation and fishing or of air space beyond the territorial sea of a coastal state and lying above its continental shelf has been preserved as a part of the high seas.

Law on Territorial Sea

Perhaps the most important convention was that concerning the territorial sea, the narrow maritime belt adjacent to a nation's coast over

which it exercises certain sovereign rights. Pursuant to these rights the coastal state may reserve all coastal trade (cabotage) and fishing for its own subjects and control the laying of cables and rules for navigation.

Nevertheless, there is a right of "innocent passage" for foreign shipping through international straits and such parts of territorial waters as are used as highways for international traffic. The convention made clear that this right extends to a peaceful foreign warship complying with the regulations of the coastal state.

The convention on the territorial sea represented significant advances in international law. A contiguous zone with a breadth not to exceed twelve miles from a coast line may be established in which controls necessary to prevent infringement of customs, fiscal and sanitary regulations may be exercised. In addition important agreements were reached on how to measure the baselines by which the territorial sea of a coastal state is actually limited.

Attempts by the Soviet Union to make waters of large bays internal waters, and thus not subject to the right of innocent passage, were blocked by restricting such bays to those not more than twenty-four miles wide at the mouth. However, an exception for "historic" bays protects such well-recognized national claims as Long Island Sound and certain Norwegian fjords.

In addition, the rights of innocent passage were protected from Soviet attack which would have restricted

the doctrine so as to make it meaningless. Indeed, the right of innocent passage was extended to include the principle that a state with a territorial sea could not be cut off from access to the open sea by the unilateral extension of the territorial sea of neighboring states so as to eliminate the high seas in the connecting straits. Thus, Israel will have a legal right of innocent passage to the Red Sea and to the Indian Ocean from its own territorial sea through the Gulf of Aqaba and the Strait of Tiran without regard to the claims of neighboring Arab states to extended territorial seas.

Perhaps the most serious threat to this country's interests was the proposal put forward by the Soviet Union to extend the territorial sea of a coastal state from three to twelve miles and for such distance beyond as the coastal state wished in its own interest. The freedom of the high seas would thus have been curtailed.

Freedom of Seas Protected

The United States was especially concerned because of the added protection and strength in time of war that this extension in breadth of the territorial sea beyond the previous limits could give Soviet submarines navigating undetected beneath the surface of the territorial waters of neutral nations. The Russians now have a number of submarines with atomic power capable of extensive underwater operations and which can fire atomic missiles with hydrogen warheads from below the surface. In time of war the territorial sea of a neutral nation would, of course, be closed to United States naval operations on its surface or in the air above.

The commercial shipping nations, which are primarily the Western powers and Japan, naturally opposed a twelve-mile or greater limit for the

breadth of a territorial sea because of its resulting restrictions on freedom of passage, reduction of fishing rights, added dangers and difficulties to navigation and curbs on commercial and military aircraft. It has been computed that as of 1951 some four-fifths of the total commercial shipping tonnage of the world had been registered with nations subscribing to the three-mile limit.

Three-Mile Limit Problem

However, many coastal nations, such as the West Coast Latin American nations, Mexico and Canada and many of the newly created nations, wished to extend their territorial sea and so end the historic fishing and navigation rights of other nations off their coasts. For many years Mexico has claimed a territorial sea out to nine miles in the Gulf of Mexico, and this has been an important issue in its acrimonious, and at times bloody, dispute with United States shrimp fishermen. Mexico put forward a proposal for a "flexible" limit from three to twelve miles at the option of the coastal state, which would be, of course, a twelve-mile limit. The West Coast Latin Americans have sought to protect their tuna and whaling industries from foreign fishing fleets off their coasts by claiming a territorial sea limit of several hundred miles. Similarly, the Canadians wish to control the rich fishing off the Grand Banks of Nova Scotia and the halibut and salmon fishing on the Pacific Coast (even though a large part of the salmon spawn in American rivers) and thus proposed a twelve-mile fishing zone under control of the coastal state.

Indonesia and the Philippines were each anxious to establish the waters between and around their many islands as continuous internal waters with no rights of innocent passage. This would have eliminated vast

areas of the high seas as well as vital navigation routes between India, the Far East and Australia.

As was expected, certain Arab states were intent on blocking Israel from access to the Red Sea via the Gulf of Aqaba and the Straits of Tiran by extending their territorial waters to twelve miles. This would have eliminated all the high seas areas which had previously made this a recognized international strait.

Also, there was resentment by the newly created nations against the Western maritime powers and Japan. In many Latin American countries economic distress was attributed to the decline in exports of coffee, cotton, lead, zinc and copper to the United States. Indeed, even the restrictions placed on such United States imports as oil which affected Venezuelan and Canadian exports and the possibility of tariffs on lead and zinc and copper lost us support.

Had the proposals for twelve-mile or even greater widths succeeded, the high seas areas in many of the major international straits would have disappeared. While surface ships could continue to pass through such straits connecting major oceans or bodies of water, foreign aircraft could not overfly extended territorial seas even in such straits in the absence of treaty or convention, such as the 1944 Chicago Civil Aviation agreements.

The United States wished to retain the traditional three-mile limit. However, in a constructive effort to meet the desires of other nations to have a broader zone over which they could exercise sanitary, fiscal and immigration jurisdiction while still keeping the breadth of the territorial sea relatively narrow, the United States put forward as a workable compromise a proposal for a territorial sea limit of six miles plus another six miles of contiguous zone for regulating fisheries only, subject to cer-

tain historical fishing rights of other nations.

This United States proposal was enthusiastically supported by all of the NATO nations, with the exception only of Iceland (which now sells a large part of its fish to the Soviet Union), and by all of the British Commonwealth, with the sole exception of Canada, which wanted an exclusive fishing zone of twelve miles. The compromise received a majority of the votes, 45 for and 33 against, and gave the United States at least a moral victory, although falling short by seven votes of the two-thirds necessary for adoption. No other proposal received a majority vote and, indeed, all others were resoundingly defeated.

U.S. Praised

Many nations did not support the United States proposal for constitutional or statutory reasons or because of objections to arbitration provisions as violating national sovereignty. These nations, nevertheless, praised the United States for its constructive and imaginative attempt to achieve an agreement on the breadth of the territorial sea where all knew it had wished to retain the three-mile limit. Indeed, the United States proposal received the moral support and vote of the Holy See.

The result of the conference is that nations such as the United States and the other maritime powers are free to maintain and to insist upon the three-mile limit with its recognized historic and local exceptions. Since all proposals for a greater width were defeated, international law is left unchanged and in force. As recently as 1951 it has been held by the International Court of Justice that the limitation of sea areas is an international question which cannot be dependent on unilateral action by any coastal state.

Much was actually accomplished and the defense interests of the United States were maintained unimpaired. However, it is difficult to settle the accumulated problems of generations in nine weeks. In spite of Iceland's recent unilateral attempt to extend its territorial sea, there is likelihood of success of appropriate regional agreements which may precede more general agreements.

The United States emerged from the conference with considerably enhanced good will and prestige due to the sympathetic interest it showed in the problems of other nations, small as well as great, and to its imaginative proposal to reach agreement on the width of the territorial sea at the sacrifice of its own interest.

It is a mistake to regard nonacceptance of a United States proposal as anti-Americanism. The cause of nonacceptance is generally a divergence of economic interests, such as those involved in the fishing disputes concerning Mexico, the West Coast Latin American states and Canada, and Canadian resentment of our surplus wheat sales, our restrictions on oil imports which affect its Northwest oil production, as well as oil from Venezuela and other countries, the inability of Canadian subsidiaries of American corporations to accept orders from Communist China and so on, and our protective tariff policies with respect to mineral and wool imports from Latin America, not to mention the Arab-Israeli problem and others.

The United States must seek solutions of such problems with other nations in a spirit of fair compromise. Americans must also continue to seek understanding of the problems of newer and smaller nations and work to overcome their natural distrust of former colonial masters and of the great maritime powers.

Almost all these nations belong to

some recognizable group with similar geographic, ethnical, economic or political interests such as the Arab or the Afro-Asian groups, the Western Europeans, the Latin Americans, the British Commonwealth, or the Soviet satellites. These groups generally confer and try to vote as groups. The United States is thus almost alone in international politics although it obtained excellent cooperation on the conventions from a number of members of these groups.

In existing circumstances the importance of understanding and gaining the support of smaller nations cannot be overemphasized, especially at large international conferences. Failure to agree on the breadth of the territorial sea should not be overemphasized. Rather the successes of the United States at Geneva should be regarded as solid progress in the leadership of the nations of the free world.

READING SUGGESTIONS: J. W. Bingham, "The Continental Shelf and the Marginal Belt," *American Journal of International Law*, Vol. 40 (January 1946), pp. 173-178; S. Whittmore Boggs, "Delimitation of the Territorial Sea," *American Journal of International Law*, Vol. 45 (April 1951), pp. 240-266; J. L. Brierly, *The Law of Nations*, 3rd ed. (New York, Oxford University Press, 1942); Walter Chapman, "U.S. Policy on High Seas Fisheries," *Department of State Bulletin*, Vol. XX, No. 498 (January 16, 1949), pp. 67ff; McDougal and Burke, "Crisis in the Law of the Sea," *Yale Law Journal*, Vol. 67, No. 4 (February 1958), pp. 539-589.

FPA Bookshelf

For a brief, interesting summary of the problems of the Middle East, packed with useful information, look at *The Lands Between*, by John S. Badeau, president of the Near East Foundation and former president of the American University in Cairo. (New York, Friendship Press, 1958, \$1.75.)

In *Algeria: The Realities*, by Germaine Tillon, a French anthropologist, in just a little over 100 pages, gives one of the most perceptive accounts not only of Algeria, which she knows intimately, but of the tragic dilemma of all archaic civilizations confronted with the tremendous task of becoming adapted to the modern world. A "must" book for all Americans who work in or teach about non-Western areas. (New York, Knopf, 1958, \$2.50.)

Spotlight

(Continued from page 172)

ent thinking." Nor does Communist China, with 600 million people, apparently relish the prospect of being classified as "a satellite" of Russia, with 200 million people.

Peiping Seeks Equality

Peiping, it would seem, expects and insists on a relationship of equality with the U.S.S.R., and may well have been alarmed, as suggested by some observers, at its exclusion from the summit conference long discussed, but at present held unlikely, between Russia and the West. Moreover, China, at its present stage of development, is in need of capital and manufactured goods, which so far it has been obtaining mostly from Russia and Eastern Europe. However, the Soviet bloc's expanding program of economic aid, which worries the United States, must also have troubled Peiping, which may no longer be able to receive the share of Soviet funds and goods which it had anticipated. In fact, some reports indicate that Moscow's attempts to postpone or abandon its promised \$285 million credits to Yugoslavia may have been connected with a demand by China for additional aid.

The other view—that Russia and China, far from being at odds with each other, are actually on the same

team, keeping the West on tenterhooks simultaneously in Europe and Asia—also finds support in current developments. For Russia, which is faced by uncertainties about the solidity of the Eastern European bloc, fissured by Yugoslavia's stand on independence, the support of China on its historically important second front in Asia must be an important consideration. And from the point of view of Peiping, the West's renewed concern about the ultimate objectives of the U.S.S.R. may be an asset in its attempts to bring about changes in the Western nations' China trade policy.

For the United States the fluidity and ambiguity of relations between Russia and China poses a series of new problems as well as new opportunities. Those Americans who had hoped for the emergence of "contradictions in the Moscow-Peking axis," now that some seem to have arisen, have to decide how this country can most effectively use them. Did the United States miss a chance for relaxation of tensions during the past year when, instead of benefiting by the seeming flexibility of Mr. Khrushchev, it insisted on setting terms for the summit conference which were patently unacceptable to Russia, such as discussion of the situation in Eastern Europe?

Should we have given serious consideration, if not necessarily accept-

ance, to the plan for "disengagement" in Central Europe, proposed by Poland's Foreign Minister Adam Rapacki, which conveyed a sense of urgency on Poland's part for the start of some kind of negotiations which might have relieved strains in Eastern Europe? Did our rejection of this plan stiffen those elements in Moscow who had insisted all along that Russia had nothing to gain by negotiating with the West and had better just hold on to what it had? Would it have been wise for the United States to have explored much earlier the possibility of easing the West's trade relations with China, as may now be done in the case of subsidiaries of American firms in Canada, notably the Ford Motor Company? And, in general, could an imaginative way have been found to assure both Russia and China that, no matter how much Americans abhor communism, the United States does not intend to prevent or destroy their efforts to industrialize their economies, or to substitute its influence for theirs in areas adjacent to their borders? Should the United States have considered Mr. Khrushchev's request for credits?

No one seems to have a firm reply to any of these questions. But it would help the American public to hear untrammelled and informed discussion of the alternatives ahead.

VERA MICHELES DEAN

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